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THE DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRESPASS
IN FRENCH LAW: AN ANALOGUE OF DUE PROCESS*
Armin Uhler t

T

HE French droit administratif, since Dicey's critical and unsympathetic comments in his lectures and works on the English
constitution,1 has continued to attract a great deal of interest in the
English-speaking world. In this country the more recent references 2
to the system known by that name are prompted by something more
than academic curiosity. Unprecedented expansion of administrative
activity, particularly on the part of the federal government, has
focussed attention on many problems 3 which have become acute because of that fact. Unquestionably, one of the most vexing among
them is the question of review of administrative action upon the application of interested private parties. It is natural that the solutions
found elsewhere should be inquired into, and that the French system
of adjudication by special administrative courts should receive particular consideration. However, if French administrative law is identified
with this one characteristic, while other important features of the
system are left unnoticed, the view obtained is necessarily incomplete
and distorted.
The French administrative courts 4 are indeed the outgrowth of

*The material in this article forms one section of a tli-is prepared in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degreee of S.J.D. at the University of Michigan.-Ed.
J.U.D., Leipzig; Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law School.-E,l.
1 D1cEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY oF THE I.Aw OF THE CoNsnTUTioN, 3d
ed., 303 ff. (1889). The first and second editions of Dicey's lectures appeared in 1885,
and 1886.
The abbreviations which will be used herein for citing cases are as follows:
D.-Dalloz, Recueil Periodique et Critique
S.-Sirey, Recueil General des Lois et des Arrets
D.H.-Dalloz, Recueil Hebdomadaire de Jurisprudence
Recueil-Recueil des Arrets du Conseil (Macaret & Lebon, edited by Panhard)
2 See, for instance, "Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law,"
A. B. A. ADVANCE PRoGR.AM 134 at 144 (1938).
8 See the interesting symposium in 47 YALE L. J. 515-674 (1938), and the
numerous articles in the current volume (24) of the American Bar Association Journal.
4 Duguit, "The French Administrative Courts," 29 PoL. Sex. Q. 385 at 389
(1914); WALINE, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 59 ff. (1936)
[hereinafter cited as "Droit administratif'']; BERTHELEMY, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE
DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 13th ed., no7 ff. (1923) [hereinafter cited as "Droit administratif'']; BoNNARD, PRECIS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF n4 ff. (1935) [hereinafter
cited as "Droit administratif''].
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certain principles embodied in the enactments of revolutionary origin.
Both constitutional and statutory provisions of the revolutionary period
sanctioned the separation of powers II and especially the separation of
the administrative and judicial authorities.6 Strictly interpreted, the
prohibition addressed to the latter precluded their adjudicating any
of the acts of the administration. Whatever review or relief might be
available, therefore, had to be accorded by the administrative authorities themselves. Almost of necessity the disposition of administrative
appeals in time came to be assigned to special judicial bodies within
the administration. But even the organization of independent machinery for the judicial determination of controversies arising from administrative action did not make absolute the separation of the two authorities. Not all acts emanating from administrative authorities are
"administrative" in the sense which renders them immune from scrutiny
by the ordinary courts. The latter, in principle, are competent to take
cognizance of all matters in which the administration's acts have no
substantial relation to governmental functions. 7 Furthermore, even
where administrative authorities profess to act with respect to governmental functions, their acts may be tainted with certain illegalities.
It is precisely in regard to this class of administrative acts, in so far as
they affect persons or property, that a closer examination of French
law reveals an extremely interesting phase of jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The principle involved is embodied in the doctrine of
'Doie de fait, which is the object of the following discussion.
11 See Law of Dec. 22, 1789, § 3, art. 7; Law of 16-24 Aug., 1790, tit. 2, art.
13; Constitution of 1791, tit. 3, c. 4, § 2, art. 3, and c. 5, art. 3; Constitution of the
year III (1794), art. 189, 203.
6 Law of 16-24 Aug., I 790, tit. 2, art. I 3, provides: "The judicial functions are
distinct and shall forever remain separate from the administrative functions. The judges
may not, under penalty of forfeiture, interfere, in any manner whatsoever, with the
operations of the administrative authorities; nor shall they summon before them administrative functionaries on account of their official acts."
The law of the 16th Fructidor, year III (1794), provides: "The courts are
again prohibited from taking cognizance of any acts of the administration of whatever
nature."
These prohibitions were enacted to meet the specific conditions which had
existed prior to the revolution, when the powerful judicial bodies of France (particularly the -parlements) frequently obstructed the policies and acts of the administration.
See EsMEIN, CouRS ELEMENTAIRE n'HISTOIRE nu DROIT FRANgA1s, I Ith ed., 582 ff.
(1912); BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PuBLIC LAw 445 ff. (1915) [translation
by Garner in the Continental Legal History Series].
7 BERTHELEMY, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 13th ed., 1100 et seq. (1933); BoNNARD, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 154 et seq. ~?935); WALINE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
45 ff. (1936).
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GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

An administrative official or authority may perform an act devoid
of legality to a degree which reduces its administrative quality to the
naked fact of its origin within the administration. If such is the case,
according to accepted doctrine of French administrative law, the administration disclaims the act as non-administrative, provided it is not
of a general regulatory nature. 8 Jurisdiction may then be exercised by
the ordinary courts without contravening the statutory prohibitions
against their taking cognizance of, and interfering with, administrative operations. But illegality is also at the foundation of certain broader
and other closely related concepts with which voie de fait 9 is easily
confused, and from which it is sometimes inadequately distinguished.
According to the time-honored formula devised by Laferriere,1°
which continues to hold sway, illegality 11 does not as a rule deprive
an act of its administrative quality 12 so as to bring it automatically
within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. To this extent the
8

As a general rule, the ordinary courts may interpret administrative regulations
though they may not inquire into their legality. Septfonds v. Chemins de fer du Midi,
D. 1924.3.41; HAuR1ou, PR:fo1s DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 12th ed., 568 (1933)
[hereinafter cited as "Droit administratif"]; APPLETON, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DU
CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF III (1927), Supp. 16 (1936) [hereinafter cited as
"Contentieux administratif"]; BERTHELEMY, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 13th ed., 124,
note (1933); BoNNARD, DR01T ADMINISTRATIF 162 (1935); WALINE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 51 (1936),
There is, however, a much discussed statutory exception, Code penal, art. 471,
§ I 5, which permits the judicial courts to verify the legality of certain ordinances.
I LAFERRIERE, TRAITE DE LA JURIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE ET DES RECOURS CONTENTIEUX, 2d ed., 480 (1896) [hereinafter cited as "Juridiction administrative"];
BERTHELEMY, supra, 1104; Reglade, "L'exception d'illegalite en France," 40 REVUE
DU DROIT PUBLIC 393 (1923) j MOREAU, LE REGLEMENT ADMINISTRATIF 260
(1902); BoNNARD, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 162 (1935); Garner, "Judicial Control of
Administrative and Legislative Acts in France," 9 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 637 (1915);
Garner, "French Administrative Law," 33 YALE L. J. 597 (1924).
9
"Administrative trespass" or "trespass" will be used interchangeably with the
French term throughout the discussion.
10 1 LAFERRIERE, JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed., 478-480 (1896). Cf.
DARESTE, LES VOIES DE RECOURS CONTRE LES ACTES DE LA PUISSANCE PUBLIQUE 168
(1914) [hereinafter cited as "Les voies de recours"]; APPLETON, CoNTENTIEUX
ADMINISTRATIF l03 (1927).
11
See 3 DuGUIT, TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 681 et seq. (1923) [hereinafter cited as "Droit constitutionnel"]; HAURiou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed.,
5z et seq. (1921), 12th ed., 577 ff. (1933). Cf. WALINE, DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF
97 et seq., 300, 323 (1926).
12
"Just as illegality or vice of form attending the decision of a judicial decision
does not destroy its judicial character." I LAFERRIERE, JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE,
2d ed., 478 (1896).
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analogy between general regulations and individual administrative
acts is complete; both must be respected by the judicial authorities
and any infirmity in one or the other only "affects its validity, not its
nature." 18 However, differential treatment has been accorded individual administrative acts and, as to them, theory and practice have
continued to recognize degrees of illegality, with the result that illegality is deemed capable of assuming proportions which will destroy the
administrative quality of the act. Such a high degree of illegality is,
according to Laferriere,14 present whenever an administrative agency
steps not only outside the sphere of its own competency but beyond
the domain constitutionally occupied by the aggregate of administrative authority.16 Any act coming ~ithin this definition constitutes a
"usurpation of power." 16 In turn, the resultant lack of administrative
quality produces consequences the nature of which depends upon
whether the act bears the semblance of a decision or order,l'l or of an
act performed in the execution of an administrative order.18 In the
former case the purported decision is simply nonexistent, while in the
latter the effects produced by the act of execution call for active redress.
A "nonexistent act" 19 by its very term implies that it is without any
effect whatever, so that it may be disregarded as a complete nullity. 20
Neither being administrative nor having any legal effect, obviously it
gives rise to no jurisdictional problem. 21
18

Ibid., 478.

14

lbid., 479.

Cf. 3 Ducu1T, DR01T coNmTUTloNNEL 714-715 (1923); DARESTE, LES
vo1ES DE RECOURS 263, 265 (1914), citing Corbon v. Vallet, D. 1877.1.9 (Cour de
Cassation, Dec. II, 1876). Cf. the language used by the commissioner of the government in Societe immobiliere de Saint-Just v. Prefet, S. 1904.3.17 at 20 (col. 2):
"Employing the customary legal terminology, it is not merely contended that [the
administrative authority] exceeded 'the limits of its powers,' but that it did not act in
'the exercise' of its powers, and that it left 'the domain legally assigned to it.' "
16 2 LAFERRIERE, JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed., 497-499 (1896);
3 Ducu1T, DRoIT coNsTITUTIONNEL 709, 713 et seq. (1923), 2 ibid. 294-295;
APPLETON, CoNTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 105, 593 et seq. (1927); BoNNARD, DR01T
ADMINISTRATIF 217 (1935).
11 "Decision executoire."
18 "Operation materielle J! execution.''
19 2 LAFERRIERE, JUR1mcTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed., 498 (1896); I ibid. 480;
DARESTE, LES v01Es DE RECOURS 153-155 (1914), and cases there cited; 3 Ducu1T,
DROIT cONSTITUTIONNEL 714 (1923); HAUR10u, DR01T ADMINISTR.ATIF, 10th ed.,
39 (1921); BoNNARD, DR01-r ADMINISTRATIF 195 (1935); WALINE, DR01T ADM1N1sTRATIF 442-444 (1936), and cases there cited.
20 2 LAFERRIERE, JuRm1cTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed., 498 (1896); JhE, LES
PRINCIPES GENERAUX DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 76 et seq. (1925); BoNNARD, DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 195 (1935); HAURIOU, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed., 39 (1921).
2 1 Because of the usurpation of power the act distinguishes itself from the act which
is illegal because of an excess of power. See 3 Ducu1T, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 714111
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On the other hand, when usurped power is transformed not only
into an executory determination but manifests itself through immediate
and tangible results in relation to the rights of the individual, then the
situation necessitates action to offset the illegal effects. 22 In such cases
it is no longer possible to speak of a "nonexisting act," 23 and under
a system which sanctions the separation of the administrative and judicial authorities, the question of jurisdiction over the fact situation
caused by the act must be dealt with. 24 As intimated at the outset, due
to its flagrant illegality, the act is deemed not to be administrative,
so that the administration is not concerned with either the act itself
or with its consequences. This construction automatically leaves the
ordinary courts competent to adjudicate any private rights alleged to
have been thus invaded, and to grant relief, without violating the
principle of the separation of authorities.
ADMINISTRATIVE TRESPASS DEFINED

Illegality in the form of a usurpation of power on the one hand,
and a direct violation of private rights on the other, are the basic
criteria which constitute an act performed by an administrative authority a trespass. 25
717 (1923); HAURiou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed., 39 (1921). Cf. the note
under Labadie v. Gaillardon, D. 1876.1.289, col. 2. The latter persists until annulled
by the administrative jurisdiction. The nonexistent act need not-2 LAFERRIERE~
JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed., 498 (1896); APPLETON, CoNTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 594 (1927)-nor, in fact, can it be annulled--BoNNARD, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 195 (1935). However, more recently the Conseil d'Etat has shown a tendency
to allow a recourse for excess of power if not for the purpose of annulling, then in order
to censure the administration acti-oe for acting illegally. See APPLETON, supra, 596;
:BoNNARD, supra, 195, and the cases cited by these authors. Cf. Matter of Frecon,
D. H. 1935.183 (Conseil d'Etat).
22
Cf. Hauriou's note under conflict Abbe Piment, S. 1910.3.129; 1 HAURIOU,
LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE DE 1892 A 1929, pp. 604, 609 (1929) [hereinafter cited as "Jurisprudence"].
28
3 DuomT, DRoIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 709 (1923). Cf. also WALINE, DRoIT
ADMINISTRATIF 443-444 (1936), as to indications of a tendency in the Conseil d'Etat
away from the doctrine of actes inexistants. Matter of Mahieu, D. H. 1932.154;
s. 1932-3-60.
24
The distinction between the nonexisting executory decision and the wholly
unauthorized act of execution has not always been made. It seems to have been stated
clearly only recently by Professor Waline in his note accompanying L'Action fran~aise
v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, D. 1935.3.25 at 26, col. 2. Cf. for in.stance, APPLETON, CoNTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 103-105, 593-596 (1927); liAURIOU, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 12th ed., 578 (1933). See 3 DuomT, DROIT coNSTITUTIONNEL 710-715
(1923). Cf. DARESTE, LEs voIEs DE RECOURS 155, note 3 (1914).
25
1 LAFERRIERE, JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed., 530 (1896). Cf. 3
DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 709 (1923); ffAURIOU, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF,
12th ed., 578 (1933); APPLETON, CoNTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 104-105 (1927);
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It does not appear that the courts themselves have ever dearly
defined the concept, although it has served as the ground of decision
in numero:us cases, and it is well to point out first this aspect of the
problem.
·
Viewing the relevant decisions as a whole, one may go so far as
to assume a reluctance on the part of the courts to fix _the limits of its
application. This obviously permits them to avoid the trespass doctrine
at times when they may prefer to attribute the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts over an act of an administrative authority to some
reason other than that it is "non-administrative"; and this, of course,
is equally true whether jurisdiction is conceded by an administrative
court, asserted by a judicial tribunal, or determined by the Tribunal
des Conflits.26
On the positive side of the problem, we have frequent applications
BoNNARD, DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF 195 (1935); WALINE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 57
(1936); Waline, note in D. 1935.3.25 at 26 et seq., and see the conclusions of the
Commissaire du Governement, ibid. Cf. also DARESTE, LES VOIES DE RECOURs, §§ 69,
70, 72, 73 (1914) j TEISSIER, LA RESPONSABILITE DE LA PUISSANCE PUBLIQUE 55-58
(1906).
.
26 ln the case of Favre v. Mas, D. 1904.2.321, referred to by DARESTE, LES VOJES
DE RECOURs 274, note 3 (1914), the Cour d'Appel de Lyon held that the arrest by
three police officers (agents des moeurs), without warrant or express authority of law,
of a woman suspected of prostitution because of her alleged conduct constituted a judicial and not an administrative act, even though performed by administrative functionaries. Consequently the judicial authority was competent in the matter of damages
which the woman sought to recover for the illegal arrest; for the judicial courts are
"the natural guardians of individual liberty" and, in principle, their jurisdiction extends
to all questions affecting that right. Dareste, ibid., points out that this formula was
used to circumvent the necessity of having the legality of an administrative act determined by the administrative jurisdiction. However, instead of reaching the same result
by way of the simple and unquestionably applicable doctrine of trespass, cf. I DucmT,
DRoIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 30 (1923), the court rested its authority upon the broader
and more impressive grounds of the judicial nature of the act and on its guardianship
in all matters of personal liberty. But see the law of February 7, 1933, D. 1933.4.65
at 66, 67, vesting jurisdiction over all matters of individual liberty in the ordinary
courts and precluding the administration from claiming jurisdiction in the Tribunal
des Conflits.
In several cases of seizures, infra at note 78, performed by police agents, the
Conseil d'Etat refused to take jurisdi'ction, and the Tribunal des Conflits under similar
circumstances confirmed the ordinary jurisdiction on the ground that the acts of seizure
were judicial in nature. The acts in those cases were indeed authorized under statutes
appointing the particular administrative agents officers of the police judiciaire. See
BERTHELEMY, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 13th ed., 267 (1933). Nevertheless it would
seem to have presented little difficulty to term administrative an act as plainly so in its
effects as the seizure of property. By way of analogy, if acts performed by administrative
functionaries are not necessarily administrative, acts emanating from judicial officers
need not indiscriminately be deemed judicial.
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by the courts of the doctrine of voie de fait. In justifying the jurisdiction of the civil courts on this ground, the emphasis is commonly
placed upon the "non-administrative" character of the act,21 so that
on the surface the separation of powers is left unimpaired. However,
it should be emphasized again that every trespass presupposes the
violation of a personal right, and it seems natural to seek an explanation of the power of the ordinary courts in that other doctrine which,
broadly stated, embodies the very marked insistence that the judicial
courts are at all times the natural guardians of civil liberties and of
property rights against invasions, even by the administrative branch
of the government. 28 It seems pertinent, therefore, to inquire whether
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in cases of administrative trespass is not but a manifestation of the desire to remit the protection
of all personal rights and liberties to the judicial authorities.
An examination of the decisions holding at various times in favor
of the ordinary jurisdiction by applying the voie de f ait doctrine
discloses the following types of cases:
I. Illegal arrest. The Cour de Cassation, in I 876, decided a case
in which an arrest had been made illegally and detention had been
prolonged in an .unlawful manner. 20 It held that the illegal arrest
21 HAuRrou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed., 35 (1921), 12th ed., 27 (1933);
BoNNARD, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 157 (1935); WALINE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 56
(1936).
28
2 DucRocQ, CouRs DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 7th ed., 13 (1897); I Aucoc,
CONFERENCES SUR L'ADMINISTRATION ET LE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 3d ed., 482
{1885); I LAFERRIERE, JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed., 514, 529 (1896);
DARESTE, LES vorES DE REcouRS 247, 272 (1914); APPLETON, CoNTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 141, 152 (1927). See also MoREAU, LE REGLEMENT ADMINISTRATIF
260 (1902); 3 DuGUIT, DROIT coNsTITUTIONNEL 30 (1923); BoNNARD, DRoIT
ADMINISTRATIF 158 (1935); WALINE, DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF 52 (1936). Cf. the cases
in IO DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE METHODIQUE ET ALPHABETIQUE, DE LEGISLATION, DE DOCTRINE ET DE JURISPRUDENCE, "Competence administrath ~," p. 472 ff., § 138 et seq.
(1848); 3 ibid. (Supp. 1888), p. 266 ff., § 209 et seq.; also the cases in the digest to
DALLOZ, REcUEIL PERIODIQUE, under "Competence administrative." For contrary
views, cf. JACQUELIN, LES PRINCIPES DOMINANTS DU CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF
82 ff., 97 ff., 106 ff. (1899); 12 REPERTOIRE GENERAL ALPHABETIQUE DU DROIT
FRAN~Ais 638, §§ 752-759 (1894). See also HAURiou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th
ed., 38, note 1, 876-877 (1921), 12th ed., 30, note 10, 347 (1933); note by Alibert
under the decision of the Tribunal des Conflits in the Matter of Melinette, S.
1933.3.97, noted 51 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 140 (1934).
29
Labadie v. Gaillardon, D. I 876.1.289 at 296, col. 2. Gaillardon was arrested
upon the order of Labadie shortly before the latter received a telegram containing his
nomination as prefect. Thereafter the prefect permitted Gaillardon to be detained
during seven days without a hearing. Gaillardon committed suicide, and his widow
sued the prefect personally in the civil courts for indemnity and recovered the judgment which the defendant below asked the Cour de Cassation to set aside.
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made was not an administrative act and that therefore the lower court
was competent to take cognizance. Although there is no express reference, the decision is a manifest application of the doctrine of trespass,
revealed in this language: "In passing upon the character [illegality]
and the consequences [invasion of personal liberty] the court below
did not interfere with any administrative act, and consequently did
not violate the principle of the separation of powers." 80
2. Illegal interference with religious freedom. The Tribunal des
Conflits recently 81 upheld the jurisdiction of the civil court which
had been invoked by a church community to secure relief from administrative interference with property devoted to religious purposes. The
action taken by the mayor was deemed not to be a proper execution of
a resolution of the town council concerning a public works, and because
of the resultant violation of religious freedom the act was characterized
as a trespass.82
There is also a series of interesting decisions of the Tribunal des
Conflits concerning religious freedom in which the trespass doctrine
was applied and the judicial competency affirmed.81 The question involved was the authority of a mayor to order the ringing of church
bells on the occasion of civil interments. Under certain statutory provisions 84 and regulations,85 church bells are recognized as belonging
to the religious cult, except in case of public danger and except in so
far as local laws and regulations or local custom do not authorize their
use for other purposes. The mayor's order to ring the bells at a civil
80 The case is noteworthy also because it is in sharp contrast with the later case of
Favre v. Mas, D. 1904.::z.. 321, discussed supra, note 26, in that it expressly holds that
the act of arrest was not a judicial function subject to inquiry only in the ordinary
courts. The point is discussed with elaboration in the note accompanying the report
of the decision.
Cf. Matter of Giniere, Recueil, 1904.88, where the Conseil d'Etat, without
qualifying its grounds for the rejet, declined to take jurisdiction over a case of alleged
arbitrary arrest of a woman.
81 July 4, 1934, Cure de Realmont v. Maire de Realmont, S. 1935.3.97.
82 The council had authorized the construction of a public comfort station at a
designated location behind a church building. The mayor had part of an iron fence
upon the church property removed and had the station placed up against the church.
In order to occupy premises devoted to religious cults, it would have been necessary to
follow a specific statutory procedure.
88 Abbe Piment v. Mayor of Grancey, Recueil, 1910.324, S. 1910.3.129; Abbe
Mignon v. Godet, Recueil, 1910.442; D. 19n.3.41; Abbe Thiney v. Dompnier,
Recueil, 1916.52. See also 3 DuGUIT, DR0IT CONSTITUTIONNEL 716 (1923); JitzE,
LES PRINCIPES GENERAUX DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 78 (1925).
84 Law of Dec. 9, 1905, art. 27; Law of Jan. 2, 1907, art. 5.
85 Ordinance of Mar. 16, 1906, art. 51, 106 DUVERGIER, CoLLECTION DES Lois
II4 (1906).
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burial, having been found in each case to be contrary_ to existing laws
and regulations and to be without the sanction of a local custom, was
held not an administrative act, but a voie de fait and therefore subject
to redress in the civil courts.36
3. Illegal damage to land. In an I 892 case 37 a conflict was decided in favor of the judicial authority in an action to recover possession
of land, to enjoin the taking of material from the land, to have the
land restored to its previous condition, and to recover damages for
material already removed and used for maintenance work on a public
road. The court found that the taking of the material was illegal and
a trespass because of non-observance of statutory formalities. 88
The Cour de Cassati on in I 90 5 held 39 that the Cour d'Appel de
Nimes did not violate the principle of the separation of powers by
ordering the restoration, at the cost of the city, of a private water
supply which had been destroyed by the city's agents, without observing the required procedure.40 The action taken was termed a trespass.
4. Illegal military requisition. On December 22, 1930, the Tribunal des Conflits resolved a "negative conflict" 41 arising from the refusal
of both the civil courts and the Conseil d'Etat to exercise jurisdiction
in an action for damages by a corporation whose canning plant had been
taken over by the military authorities. 42 The Tribunal ordered the
judicial court to take cognizance because the requisition, not having been
preceded by compliance with the statutory formalities, constituted a
trespass.
36 Cf., however, the recourse for excess of power to the Conseil d'Etat in the case
of Abbe Bruant v. Mayor of Breurey-les-Favemey, D. 1911.3.41 at 42. Under identical facts, with the exception that the mayor alleged a local custom, the Conseil d'Etat
(July 8, 1910) apparently treated the act as administrative, though it denied the existence of a custom, and annulled it.
In a note concerning this and the above decisions ( also reported in S. 191 o.3.129), Hauriou reconciles the holding of the Conseil d'Etat with those of the Tribunal
des Conflits through an interesting analysis: The order of the mayor to ring the bells
was considered by the Council as a decision executoire while the Tribunal deemed it
to be an act of execution. This dual aspect of an order, or the coincidence of a decision
with the order causing its execution, is only possible in case of verbal orders in which
the two. elements, though present, cannot be readily discerned. I HAURiou, JuRisPRUDENCE 604, 609 et seq. (1929).
87
Lebel v. Bault, D. 1892.3.110.
8
'8 Authorization by prefect. Law of May 21, 1836, art. 17. See "procedural
trespass," infra, p. 221.
89
City of Mende v. Roussel, D. 1910.1.266 at 269.
40 See "procedural trespass," infra, p. 22 I.
u BERTHELEMY, DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF, 13th ed., 1096 (1933); BoNNARD,
DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 165 (1935); WALINE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 40 (1936).
42
Matter of Union Villeneuvoise de Conserves, D. H. 1931.135.
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5. Illegal encroachments on private property. A typical situation
that :finds its way into the courts with some frequency arises in connection with encroachments on private property in the course of installing electric line equipment. In I 884 48 the Tribunal des Con:flits
affirmed the competency of the civil court in which an action was
pending against the administration on account of telephone line equipment an<j apparatus installed on top of plaintiff's buildings. Finding
that the prefect, in ordering the construction upon private property,
had acted without statutory or regulatory authority, the Tribunal held
that the act was not administrative. 44 In a recent case 45 the Conseil d'Etat
termed a voie de f ait the placing of telephone line supports into the
fa~ades of private buildings without observing the statutory procedure
provided by the law of I 8 85. 40
6. Illegal abridgment of the freedom of the press. The safeguarding of the press has given the ordinary courts further occasion to assert
their jurisdiction where the administration appeared to have committed a flagrant violation. In the widely discussed case of L'Action
franfaise,4 1 the Tribunal des Conflits held. "the general seizure of a
newspaper, wherever the same may be offered for sale" on a certain
day, to be a trespass and subject to redress in the civil courts. The
Tribunal gave as the reason that the measure taken by the prefect of
Paris in that form was not indispensable for the restoration and maintenance of the public order.
If unequal weight is, for any reason, to be given to one or the other
Neveux v. Administration des Postes et Telegraphes, Recueil, 1884.909.
In consequence of this litigation, the competent minister submitted a draft of a
statute regulating the procedure to be followed by the prefect under similar circumstances. It became law on July 28, 1885. 85 DtJVERGIER, COLLECTION DES Lois 444
(1885).
45 Matter of Frecon, D. H. 1935.183, summarized 52 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
340 (1935), and cases there cited. Cf. the cases in D. 1937.1.17 (Cour de Cassation);
54 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 517 (1937).
46 Supra, note 44. It should be noted, however, that the Conseil d'Etat annulled
the act of the administration and referred the plaintiff to the civil courts "which alone
are competent to adjudicate the consequences of a r;oie de fait." The annulment of an
executed decision, of course, amounts to no more than a censure, and the holding of
the Conseil d'Etat does not imply that such an annulment was necessary before the
judicial authorities could take jurisdiction. Had the case been brought before the civil
court at the outset, and had the administration asserted a conflict, the latter would
unquestionably have been resolved in favor of immediate action in the ordinary court
without the previous intervention· of the Conseil d'Etat. It may well be supposed that
the particular procedure was employed for the very purpose of bringing the matter
before the administrative jurisdiction in order to provoke an expression of its attitude
toward the issue involved.
47 L'Action fran;aise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, D. 1935.3.25; 52 REVUE DU DROIT
PUBLIC 322 (1935).
48

44
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of the two basic factors of (I) illegality of the act as such, and ( 2)
illegality in its consequences, the foregoing cases 48 strongly tempt the
conclusion that the greater weight should attach to the fact of invasion
of private rights. But if this were correct, it would in fact follow that
every act which directly or indirectly results in injury to private.rights
is "non-administrative." Quite obviously, this does not correspond to
the actual state of French legal doctrine. In the first place, the judicial
competency at times has been predicated upon the formal aspect of the
act where the court avoided the concept of 'Voie de fait by holding
the act to be judicial.49 Furthermore, not all illegal administrative
invasions of the particular rights are trespasses, as will develop further.
The utility of the trespass concept 50 and the consequent necessity of
appraising separately and individually the act as distinguished from
its consequences must be looked for in certain specific considerations
which go to the very essence of the French system of administrative
jurisdiction. While the courts of the judicial hierarchy alone are competent to determine the scope of private rights and to give relief in the
event of their violation, the theory of French law is that the legality
and propriety of acts by administrative officials as a rule can be determined only by the administrative tribunals. In regard to such acts,
under protection of the fundamental statutes sanctioning administrative
independence, the administrative courts will be the sole judges of
their formal validity, their "administrative legality." The administrative department will not tolerate its own acts to be condemned, except
by its own tribunals. Its interest is concerned with the act and its
administrative purpose, while the judicial authorities may deal with
its collateral and secondary effects. But it may be that those effects are
so drastic as to be wholly out of proportion to the original purpose.
At such a juncture the administration may be assumed to be no longer
interested in being identified with the act. Submission of the question
48 The situations exemplified by these cases are practically identical with those
envisaged by Laferriere as involving the jurisdiction of judicial tribunals. 1 LAFERRIERE, JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed.,'479-480, 530 (1896).
49
Favre v. Mas, D. 1904.2.321.
50
There are some attempts to deny completely the validity of the ooie de fait
concept. Laroque, in a note accompanying the report of the Cure de Realmont v.
Maire de Realmont decision, S. 1935.3.97, discussed at note 31 supra, questions the
grounds for the decision on that account. He finds justification for the jurisdiction of
the civil court not in the violation of the freedom of religion but in the illegal entry
upon the church property. Generally, he recognizes the principle of judicial competency only in the case of invasion of privately owned real property. See also the note
by Blaevoet under the decisions reported in D. 1937.1.17 at 18, col. 2. Cf. HAuRIOu, DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF, 12th ed., 26, note 5 (1933).
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of legality to it for inquiry is no longer insisted upon. It may be more
convenient and less injurious to the administrative prestige to abandon
the enfant terrible and to let it be disciplined at the hands of the
judicial court-to let it be branded a voie de fait.
The trespass concept is elastic. The civil courts may readily apply
it, while the administration remains unwilling. The degree of illegality
may vary according to the dissimilar views which must be harmonized
through the office of the Tribunal des Con:flits. The doctrine of "administrative trespass" seems to· have a definite place in the French regime
administratif. It will yet appear more clearly that it does not coincide
with the notion of faute personnelle, i.e., delictual or quasi-delictual
abuse of power by administrative functionaries which may result in
personal liability. Considering it from the standpoint of the judicial
tribunals, it offers the advantage of eliminating reference to the
administrative jurisdiction to determine the validity of the act attacked. The doctrine of voie de f ait, then, seems to serve the administrative as well as the judicial authorities. And paradoxical as it may
seem, the principle makes for flexibility.
THE ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS ANALYZED

The very fact that the doctrine of voie de f ait has received close
attention and analysis only in the comparatively recent legal literature
is significant. It points undoubtedly to the cause which, during the past
two decades, has engendered a great deal of new and penetrating interest in the relation of the administrative and judicial authorities.
That cause, in France the same as in this country, is the rapid expansion of administrative activity since the Great War. During this period
it would indeed have been strange if the notion of administrative trespass had escaped the searching thought of modern legal writers. 51
According to Hauriou, who was the first to undertake careful
analysis and definition, the illegality tainting the act of an administrative authority may assume two distinct forms. Trespasses may arise
not only from a usurpation of power,52 reflected in the ends towards
which the act is directed, but also from the unlawfulness of the means
employed, i.e., from disregard of procedural requirements. So trespass,
classified on the basis of intrinsic defects, has been subdivided 58 into
51 See HAURiou, DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed., 35 (1921); 12th ed., 26
(1933); BoNNARD, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 157 (1935); Waline, note in D. 1935-3-25
at 26.
52 Supra, at note 16.
53 HAURiou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed., 35 (1921); 12th ed., 26 (1933).
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trespass due to lack of lawful authority H and trespass due to procedural irregularity. 55 Trespass of the first type presupposes an act
performed outside the exercise of a right previously regulated by
formal legislative act or administrative regulation. 56 The absence of a
right to act results, then, in an excess of power attended by a total
lack of authority. On the other hand, in the case of "procedural trespass," there is an excess of power because of a total disregard for
required formalities. 57
A second classification of trespass on the basis of intrinsic illegality,
suggested by Bonnard,58 seems to cliffer from the foregoing rather in
the detail than in the essence of the distinction made. This analysis
arrives at (a) trespass because of irregularity in the executed decision,
and (b) trespass because of irregularity in the act of execution itself.
The first type is attributable to the virtual non-existence of the purported decision, 59 i.e., a decision which is ineffectual because it tends
to operate upon a subject-matter wholly beyond the powers of the
administration 60 or because made without any express statutory authority. The second type of irregularity is subclassified according to four
different situations in which it may occur: (I) intrinsic illegality in the
means of execution, ( 2) abuse of an intrinsically legal means, (3) employment of a legal means of execution but with complete disregard
of the procedure prescribed, ( 4) employment of a legally permissible
method of enforcement but without the authorization by a judicial
Voie de fait par manque de droit ("for want of right'').
V oie de fait par manque de procedure ("for want of procedure").
116 Hauriou's qualifying phrase "for want of right" envisages both the constitutional
powers and authority derived from legislative enactments. Hauriou emphasizes that
there is an autonomous regulatory power which the administration may exercise to
determine its own rigkts within a domain that not even the legislature may arbitrarily
limit. HAuR1ou, DR01T ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed., 25, 34, 52 (1921). If on the one
hand the administration has only such rights as have been specifically regulated by
legislative enactment or by its own rules, administrative regulations on the other hand,
although they must not be contrary to the laws, "may go as far as they are not checked
by the laws." Ibid., p. 35, note 1. Cf. conflit Piment, Recueil, 1910.324, S. 1910.3.129.
57 See Hauriou's note under Societe immobiliere de Saint-Just v. Prefet, S.
1904-3- I 7; 1 HAURiou, JURISPRUDENCE 84 and quotation at 100 ( 1929): "It is very
important to confine the administration to its habitual procedure, otherwise, whenever
the ordinary methods (mesures de kaute police) proved inconvenient, there would be
added extraordinary procedures. • •• There should no more be extraordinary methods
in administration than in the courts of justice."
58 BoNNARD, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF l 57 ( I 93 5) •
59 Supra, at note l 9.
60 Supra, p. 212. 1 Ducu1T, ETUDES DE DROIT PUBLIC 1 1 et seq. ( 1901) ; 1 EsMEIN, ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 33-35, 548 (1921).
54
55
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authority which (subject to certain exceptions) is required in all
cases of forced execution against persons or property. 01 The situations
contemplated under (a) clearly, and those under (b) (1) and (2) if
only slightly re-formulated, correspond to Hauriou's rnanque de droit,
while (b) (3) and (4) are typical instances of "want of procedure."
Perhaps the broader definition is preferable in that it does not attempt
to anticipate all possible situations.
The analysis which leads to the finding of two distinct classes of
formal infirmities in the act-( I) absence of authority derived from a
positive general rule, and ( 2) non-observance of procedural forms in
the execution-·-has not always been recognized 62 notwithstanding the
judicial decisions which clearly support it. Examples of procedural
trespass will be found in the cases already referred to. In the Realmont
case 68 the court held that "in the absence of a disappropriation pronounced in accordance with the statutory C54l provisions, the removal
of the fence and the installation of the public comfort station . . .
constituted a trespass." 65 Instances of purely procedural trespass will
occur most frequently in connection with the taking of private property
for public use. So in the Lebel case 66 the failure to obtain the required
statutory authorization of the prefect 67 caused the removal of materials
61 It is interesting to note that in this one instance Bonnard associates the trespass
doctrine with the oft-asserted principle of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts over
all questions affecting individual liberty and private property. However, there seems
to be no adequate reason for differentiating between invasions of the private domain
through direct enforcement of general police measures against persons and property as
in case of arrests or seizures, and incidental encroachments arising in connection with
administrative operations such as unauthorized destruction or taking of private property
for the public benefit.
62 3 DuGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 709-710, 716-717 (1923); APPLETON,
CoNTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 104-105, 593-594 (1927).
63 Cure de Realmont v. Maire de Realmont, S. 1935.3.97, discussed supra at
note 31.
64 Art. 13 of the law of Dec. 9, 1905, concerning the separation of the church
from the state provides that church property can be taken only upon a decree of the
Conseil d'Etat, or under a special act of the legislature.
65 S. 1935.3.97 at 99. The court's language in this case in fact indicates that a
double trespass was found. The administrative authority had not only taken church
property without observing certain statutory formalities, but it had at the same time
violated the religious freedom. Combinations of illegality in the form of usurpation of
power with taking of private property may occur in other situations as well. Compare
the instances of seizures of newspapers or printing machinery: encroachments upon the
freedom of the press. Obviously coincidences of this type, together with the comparative frequency of trespass in regard to property, have militated against the general
recognition of the utility of the concept of administrative ooie de fait.
66 Lebel v. Bault, D. l 892.3.110, discussed supra at note 37.
61 Art. 16 of the law of May 21, 1836, concerning rural highways.
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from private land for road purposes to be qualified as a trespass. Similar conclusions were reached because of the disregard of statutory
procedure in the Union Villeneuvoise 68 and the Frecon 69 cases.10
Until very recently, analytical treatment has been confined to the
forms of illegality which convert the act of an administrative authority
into a trespass; and the attendant violations of specific rights and liberties have received only incidental attention. 11 However, the aftermath
of an uncommonly important decision rendered by the Tribunal des
Conflits on April 8, 1935, brought with it a particularly penetrating
examination of the elements of voie de f ait by Professor Waline,12
and for once an equal amount of attention was given the criterion of
"invasion of private property or of public liberties." 78 The result
has been to distinguish a third characteristic, namely, that a violation
of a civil right or liberty is not sufficient to constitute a trespass unless
the injury is especially severe. That the degree, or severity, of the
unlawful invasion of rights and liberties is relevant is exemplified by
cases in which the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts was not conceded
although the first and second prerequisites of voie de fait were satisfied.
In order to understand the modern meaning and significance of the
doctrine of voie de fait in French law, it becomes necessary to analyze
in detail the resolution of the conflict in the case of L'Action franfaise
v. Bonnefoy-Sibour.H The Action franfaise case involved the powers
68 Matter of Union Villeneuvoise de Conserves, D. H. 1931.135, discussed supra
at note 42. There the formalities prescribed by the law of July 3, 1877 (as amended)
relative to military requisitions had been completely omitted.
69 D. H. 1935.183, supra at note 45. Telephone line equipment had been
attached to the walls of a privately owned building with complete disregard of the
requirements of notice and hearing provided by art. 6 et seq. of the law of July 28,
I 88 5, pertaining to the construction, maintenance, and operation of telegraph and
telephone lines. 85 DUVERGIER, COLLECTION DES Lois 446 (1885).
70 See also 3 DALLoz, REPERTOIRE PRATIQUE, "Competence Administrative,"
257-258, § 136 et seq. (1912).
11 HAuRrou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed., 34 ff. (1921); BoNNARD, DRoIT
ADMINISTRATIF 157 (1935).
72 See Waline's note in D. 1935.3.25. Waline is otherwise in agreement with
Hauriou and Bonnard and distinguishes trespass arising from complete want of authority from trespass due to non-observance of formalities prescribed by statute and intended
for the protection of private persons.
73 Deemed "public liberties" are the constitutionally guaranteed liberties. 1 WALINE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 52 (1936).
74 D. 1935-3-25; 53 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 296 (1936). The decision is in
the customarily concise form: "In view of the laws of .August 16-24, l 790, Fructidor
16, year III, Pluviose 28, year VIII, July 29, 1881, and April 5, 1884.
"Considering that the action instituted by the publishing company L'Action
fran!;aise against Bonnefoy-Sibour before the justice of the peace of the northern canton
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of the administrative authorities in regard to the freedom of the press.
Upon order of the prefect of police of Paris, plaintiff's newspaper had
been seized on the morning of February 7, 1934, at all places where
it was held for sale and distribution, within the city of Paris and the
Departement de la Seine. The Tribunal des Confiits confirmed the
jurisdiction of the civil court, which the prefect of police of Paris had
questioned upon the commencement of an action for damages against
him. The seizure had been ordered under the very grave political situation existing in Paris during the night of February 6, and even the
commissioner of the government pointed out that 75 "if ever a police
prefect could make use of exceptional powers it was during that night,
and the seizure of newspapers containing appeals to riot could well
constitute a legitimate use of police powers to the extent that the seizure
was indispensable for the prevention of renewed and more serious
disorders." 16 Underlying the conclusions of Commissioner Josse, which
the court adopted, is a minute analysis of the jurisdictional issue, and
through them considerable light is thrown upon the broader implications of the trespass doctrine which follow from its application in the
case.
The Tribunal des Conflits had to determine whether or not it was
of Versailles has for its object the reparation of the damage caused by the seizure of
the newspaper L'Action frtmfaise on the morning of February 7, 1934, ordered by the
prefect of police to be made at the depositories of that newspaper in Paris and in the
Department of the Seine;-considering that the seizure of newspapers is regulated by
the law of July 29, 188 I; that, although it is the duty of the mayors, and in Paris of
the prefect of police, to take the measures necessary for the preservation of public order
and safety, these duties do not carry with them the power to cause, as a preventive
measure, the seizure of a newspaper, without a showing that the seizure ordered in such
a general manner as appears from the record, viz., wherever the newspaper shall be
offered for sale, in Paris as well as in the suburbs, was indispensable for the maintenance
or restoration of the public order; that, therefore, the measure attacked in the circumstances constituted but a trespass so that the judicial authorities have jurisdiction over
the case actually pending before the court of Versailles;-considering nevertheless that
the court could not, without exceeding its powers, condemn the prefect to the costs on
account of the rejection of his challenge [ concerning the jurisdiction], because the
prefect [in asserting a conflict] did not act as a party to the proceeding but as representative of the sovereign power:
"Art. 1. The arrete de conflit made by the Prefect of the Seine-and-Oise on
December 20, 1934 is annulled.
"Art. 2. The disposition in the judgment of the civil court of Versailles, dated
December 14, 1934, condemning the Prefect of the Seine-and-Oise to the costs is
deemed not to have been made."
75 D. 1935-3-25 at 30, col. 2.
76 The prefect of police, under art. 8, of an order of March 13, 1924, concerning
concessions of newsstands by the city of Paris, had power to prohibit the sale at those
stands of newspapers which in his opinion endangered the public order; but he had no
such special power as to the sale in other places, as for instance in the streets.
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proper for the Civil Court of Versailles to allow the action against the
prefect. This necessitated individual consideration of the possible
factors which could subject the act of an administrative functionary to
the scrutiny of a civil court. In the first place, the question arose
whether the prefect had committed a "personal mistake," i.e., a delictual or quasi-delictual act which would involve only his personal liability. The question was answered in the negative by the commissioner,
and implicitly by the court, on the ground that the prefect had not acted
for personal motives 11 but undeniably for the purpose of maintaining
and restoring public order in the city of Paris on that critical day. He
"exercised police powers which he had or believed he had; whether
wrongly or rightly, legally or illegally, mattered little as far as jurisdiction is concerned."
Secondly, there was an apparent analogy in the facts of the case
to those of three earlier cases 78 decided by the Tribunal des Confl.its
in 1889. At that time it had held the ordinary courts competent to
entertain the suits which had been instituted against several prefects as
the sequel of certain seizures ordered by them, and which were found
to constitute invasions of the freedom of the press. It was necessary
therefore to determine whether the problem of jurisdiction was to be
disposed of accordingly. The commissioner demonstrated at length
that the earlier decisions could no longer stand as precedents in the
solution of the present case. True, the freedom of the press was still
regulated by the same statute,79 which prohibits preventive confiscations by the administration and permits seizures only in connection
11 The exact formula referred to again is one originally devised by Laferriere who
defined faute personnelle as an act "which reveals the man with his human weaknesses,
his passions, his indiscretions," instead of "the official, the representative of the State,
more or less subject to errors." l LAFERRIERE, JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed.,
648 (1896).
78 Dufeuille v. Prefect of Police, Usannaz-Joris v. Lefebvre, and Michau et Lafreney v. Boegner, D. 1890.3.65.
All of these cases involved political agitations directed against the republican
government by the former nobility of France, in particular by Philippe, Comte de
Paris. In the first case the prefect of police of Paris had ordered the seizure of a manifesto addressed by the Count of Paris to mayors and towns of France, as well as of
plates and signature stamps used in the printing. In the second case the Prefet de la
Savoie had seized at a post office letters similarly addressed and containing copies of
the same manifesto. In the third case the Prefet du Loiret ordered the seizure of likenesses of the Count of Paris to be distributed with a newspaper. The courts in which
the respective complaints were received were held to have power to give relief by way
of ordering the restitution of the confiscated property or by assessing damages against
the prefects, not, however, to hold the postmaster liable in damages for having surrendered the letters, as in the second case.
79
Law of July 29, 1881, concerning the freedom of the press, D. 1881.4.65, as
amended December 12, 1893, D. 1894.4.9.
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with specific cases of criminal prosecutions for designated o:ffenses. 80
However, in the former adjudications the Tribunal upheld the jurisdiction of the civil courts, not because the action taken by the prefects
violated the statute which safeguarded the freedom of the press, but
because they had acted in the exercise of powers conferred upon them
by Article IO of the Code d'lnstruction Criminelle, as "officers of the
judicial police," 81 rather than in their administrative capacity. In the
Action franfaise case the prefect did not act in such capacity nor in aid
of a criminal prosecution,82 but strictly in the exercise of police powers.
Justification for the ordinary jurisdiction then had to be found elsewhere.
Consequently, the action of the prefect of police had to be examined in the light of an act of an administrative official performed
in the exercise of his functions and not involving a faute personnelle.
The conclusions point out that under normal circumstances the seizure
of newspapers would indeed amount to such a flagrant violation of the
freedom of the press that it would no longer be an exercise of police
powers, but that it would constitute a trespass. 83 Nevertheless, the fact
that a liberty, such as the freedom of the press, is protected and that
violations are subject to judicial redress according to statute, does not
nullify the police powers which the administration derives from other
laws. 84 It is of particular interest to note that the commissioner in this
so Provocation to crimes such as murder, arson, crimes against the security of the
state. See Law of December I 2, 1893, supra, note 79.
81
Cf. the instances of illegal arrest (supra, at notes 26 and 29) where the jurisdiction also was motivated with the judicial nature of the function. Cf. also the cases
cited by the commissioner (Matter of Spitz, Recueil, 1920. 1006; Matter of Dubois,
Recueil, 1921.231; Matter of Huignard, Recueil, 1923.727; Matter of Marquie
Recueil, 1926.383) in which the Conseil d'Etat declined to assume jurisdiction
because the seizures had been made by commissaires de police "acting in their capacity
as officers of the judicial police."
82
At the particular time, art. 1 o, Code d'lnstruction Criminelle, was not in force,
having been abrogated by the law of February 7, 1933. It was, however, re-enacted in
a limited sense by art. 6 of the law of March 25, 1935, amending the Code d'lnstruction Criminelle. S. 1935.1481. See WALINE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 450 (1936).
88
Citing two cases decided by the Cour de Cassation involving violations of the
press law of July 29, 1881: De Lajudie v. Pomarede, and Vaugeois-Heron v. Rieunier,
D. 1919.1.32.
84
This point is illustrated by a number of cases in which the Conseil d'Etat indicated the extent of the general police power. So it was held that the "freedom of advertising" {art. 17, law of July 29, 1881, supra, note 79) was not violated by a police
order prohibiting the use of special vehicles for advertising purposes in the streets of
Paris, in the interest of the safety and convenience of traffic. Hostein & Co., D. 1901.3.53; Compagnie nouvelle des Chalets, Recueil, 1902.42. Cf. Matter of Cotte, Recueil,
1924.839, concerning the destruction of "suspicious" billboards under the order of a
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case denied that a collision of the exercise of those powers with a
protected liberty is of itself sufficient to exclude the administrative
jurisdiction from passing upon the action taken and its consequences.
The final conclusions for the solution of the principal case were
drawn from the precedents reviewed. If the administrative authorities
through the use of general police powers may curtail constitutional
liberties without committing a trespass85-the ordinary jurisdiction being
prefect duly authorized by the Minister of the Interior in 1914; held not in violation
of the above law of July 29, 1 8 8 1.
Respecting the scope of the general police power in regard to "public liberties"
(peddling, art. 18, law of July 29, 1881), the decision of the Conseil d'Etat of Nov.
30, 1928, in Matter of Penicaud, D. H. 1929.39, referred to by the commissioner,
appears especially pertinent. It was held that the statute did not preclude the mayors'
and prefects' exercising their general police powers in the ~nterest of peace and order,
and consequently they could prohibit the distribution of "writings" apt to endanger the
public order in the vicinity of schools, churches, barracks, or factories; but that it would
be an excess of power and contrary to the statute to prohibit the distribution of all
writings whatsoever in all cases where there is a certain congestion of traffic.
Enlarging further the background of the extent of the police power, there is
repeated emphasis in the conclusions on a decision of the Conseil d'Etat (May 19,
1933) annulling a prefect's decree prohibiting a public address by a named speaker for
the purpose of preventing anticipated disturbances of the public order. The language
employed by the court is of interest in connection with the principal case: The right
of free assembly being involved, "the alleged probability of disturbances did not present
such a degree of graveness that the public order could not have been maintained without
prohibiting the meeting." This implies that under different circumstances the same
order might have been a proper police measure. Recours Benjamin, D. 1933.3.54 at 57.
Completing the sketch, two cases of confiscation are considered in order to
demonstrate the right of the administrative authorities under the general police powers
to interfere directly with property rights. In Monpillie v. Gruet, Mayor of Bordeaux,
D. 1921.1.41, the Cour de Cassation affirmed the incompetency of the ordinary courts
in an action against the mayor on account of the seizure of meat brought into the city
without having been submitted for inspection and stamping in accordance with a city
ordinance. The reason was that both in issuing the order and in causing the seizure
pursuant to it, the mayor had remained within his police powers and his administrative
functions (art. 97, law of April 5, 1884, Municipal Organization). And the Conseil
d'Etat, in principle, decided that a mayor under his police powers may proceed to
confiscate deteriorated foods where such action is urgent in view of the existence of
serious danger to the public health.
85 Additional precedents sanctioning the administrative jurisdiction (i.e. denying
the trespass character of the act) in case of illegal invasions of those rights, are cited in
Professor Waline's note, D. 1935-3-25. The Conseil d'Etat held itself competent to
adjudicate a matter of illegal detention and utilization of a foreign neutral vessel. Matter of Chan Pek Chun, Recueil, 1931.1125. (The case is relied on by Laroque, in a
note in S. 1935.3.97, supra, note 50, in his endeavor to discredit the ooie de fait doctrine.) In this particular instance the question seems pertinent whether the diplomatic
upects of the case contributed to the retention of jurisdiction by the Conseil d'Etat. Furthermore, one may well ask if and upon what grounds the administrative jurisdiction
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justified neither by the presence of a malfeasance nor by the judicial
nature of the function performed-then the action impeached in the
case before the court can be withheld from the administrative jurisdiction only because there was something in the attending circumstances
which deprived the seizure of the newspaper of its otherwise administrative character and reduced it to a mere violation of the law protecting the freedom of the press. 86 This raises two further questions: (I)
Did the police powers of the prefect extend to the seizure made in the
circumstances? ( 2) If so, was the seizure ordered, and made, as a means
to an end, or as an end in itself?
The first question presents two aspects, one concerning the existence
of the power as such, and the other regarding the mode of exercising
it. That in the case of the prefect of police the power did exist offered
little difficulty. On the one hand, under the terms of the concessions
of the city-owned newsstands, the display and sale of publications
deemed by the administration to endanger the public order could be
prohibited. On the other hand, since the authority .of the police extended to whatever might affect the order on the public streets,87
the sale of a newspaper inciting to violence in the streets of an already
inflamed city could also be prohibited by the prefect. However, whether
might have been vindicated before the Tribunal des Conflits had the action of the owner
of the ship been instituted in the civil court.
In the case of Bailly v. Carques, D. 1918.3.1 at 4, irregularities in effecting
military requisitions of beef cattle and grain, in the opinion of the Tribunal des Conflits, did not deprive the respective acts of their administrative character so as to justify
the jurisdiction of the civil court. This case should be compared with the Union
Villeneuvoise case, D. H. 1931.135, discussed supra at note 42. There is a difference
both in the degree of procedural irregularity, and in the consequences. The former
case involves the taking of some personal property while the latter was concerned with
taking possession of an entire factory. It should be noted, however, that in the Bailly
case the court did not refer to the trespass doctrine as an alternative solution but rather
reached its decision on the basis of the distinction between faute de service and faute
personnelle, i.e. by denying the quasi-delictual character of the acts in question. If in
the third case cited, De Gaste v. Hospices, D. 1895-3-45 at 46, the Tribunal des
Conflits decided in favor of the administrative jurisdiction "because there was no trespass, even though construction on a public works had been begun prior to any administrative formalities and a water course to which plaintiffs claimed a right had been
diverted" (Waline, D. 1935.3.25 at 27), it should nevertheless also be noted that the
court expressly held that there had been no dispossession and that the right claimed was
not a property right.
86 Although the 1889 cases, discussed at note 78, denied all right of preventive
seizure of newspapers, the commissioner insisted that "not every seizure of a newspaper
is, nor can it be, a trespass" per se. D. 1935.3.25 at 30.
87 Baldy v. Prefet, D. 1920-3-25 (Conseil d'Etat, Aug. 10, 1917); see art. 97,
law of April 5, 1884, Organization of Municipalities. Cf. Hostein & Co., D. 1901-3-53;
Compagnie nouvelle des Chalets, Recueil, 1902.42.
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it could be seized raised a di:fferent, more delicate issue. As to the
newstands, the action taken was appropriate under the special terms
of the concessions. On the other hand, in regard to the street sales, the
seizure was construed as a direct sanction of an implied prohibition to
sell.
Administrative trespasses often stage their appearance under the
cloak of such acts of direct execution, and, therefore, the jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts depends frequently upon whether or not an
administrative authority was entitled to proceed immediately against
a person or property. 88 The commissioner in the Action franfaise case
found that under the prevailing doctrine 89 the action of the prefect was
generally justifiable because of the exceptional circumstances. The
seizure of the newspaper was not illegal per se: there had been a
legal duty to maintain order, and there existed an emergency and immediate danger to the public safety arising from the sale of printed
matter inciting to violence. This called for prompter action than could
be obtained through the intervention of the judicial authorities. How88 On the highly controversial aspects of the problem of direct administrative
execution, see Berthelemy, "De l'exercice de la souverainete par l'autorite administrative," 21 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 209 (1904); DARESTE, LEs VOIES DE RECOURS
71-89 (1914); HAURiou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th ed., 77-80 (1921); 12th ed.,
578-582 (1933), and his note accompanying the Saint-Just decision, S. 1904.3.17;
I HAURIOU, JURISPRUDENCE 84, 99, et seq. (1929); BoNNARD, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
186-187 (1937); WALINE, DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF 451-454 (1936): "This is one of
the most delicate problems of our public law, because it brings into conflict two fundamental principles: the personal liberty and the respect due the laws."
89 The Commissioner relied on the authority of the decision of the Conseil d'Etat
in Matter of Anduran, D. 1925.3.43. Upon the recourse of the owner of a flour mill
whose plant had been "sealed" because of numerous known and suspected violations of
certain statutes, it was held that the administration exceeded its powers in resorting to
a sanction not provided for in the respective statutes which provided other adequate
means, since this was "not a case of emergency and immediate danger." The principle
was established in the famous case of Societe immobiliere de Saint-Just v. Prefet du
Rhone, S. 1904.3.17; D. 1903-3-41.
See also Monpillie v. Gruet, D. 1921.1.41; recours Gilibert, Recueil, 1933.930;
recours Suremain, Recueil, 1907.345; Matter of Societe fran,;aise d'industrie chimique
S. 1916.3.1; I HAURiou, JURISPRUDENCE 120 (1929); Matter of Cotte, Receuil,
1924.839; Matter of Societe Laitiere Maggi, D. H. 1924, p. 170.
It is particularly noteworthy that the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts here
must, at least in part, be attributed to the fact that those courts can give injunctive
relief, while no similar remedy is available in the administrative courts. Attempts have
not been lacking to equip the latter with corresponding powers of injunction. BoNNARD,
DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF 159 ( l 93 5); Jacquelin, "L'evolution de la procedure administrative," 19 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 373 (1903), 20 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 5 at
17-19 (1903); I HAURiou, JuRISPRUDENCE 108 (1929); see the conclusions of the
commissioner in the Saint-Just case, D. 1935.3.25.

230

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 37

ever, the commissioner concluded that the act was nevertheless a
trespass on account of certain motives imputable to the prefect and
because of the apparent objective. Due to the general scope of the
order "to seize the newspaper Action franfaise at all places where held
for sale in Paris and suburbs," the seizure was not limited to designated places within an area where the sale of that newspaper would
actually have been a menace to the public order and safety. The real
intent of the prefect therefore was not to forestall the potential effect
of such sales, but to prevent the distribution of a specific commodity as
such. On the basis of this construction, the commissioner suggested,90
and the court held, that the act of seizure constituted a trespass and
that the civil court had jurisdiction in the matter.
The Action franfaise decision quite obviously injects new and important considerations into the analysis of administrative trespass.
Though sanctioning in principle an extension of the police powers as
against the freedom of the press-and by implication against all civil
liberties-it indicates the function of the doctrine as a check upon administrative discretion. 91
In evaluating the implications of the decision, the final conclusions
of the commissioner have not been generally accepted. 02 The construction adopted by the commissioner is rather ingenious; proceeding
from the general scope of the impeached order,93 he finds in the implied motive of the prefect 9 -1, the illegality which deprives the act of
its administrative character. Thus the act appears no longer as a proper
police measure but solely as a trespass upon the freedom of the press,
subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the civil court. This construction is
not necessarily reflected in the language of the decision, 95 upon which
90 D. 1935.3.25 at 31, col. I ; 53 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 296 (1936): "What
we ask you [ the court] • . . is that you confirm the existence of a police power to
restrict, or paralyze temporarily, civil liberties which are guaranteed and regulated by
law, be it the freeedom of the press or the freedom of assembly, whenever exceptional
circumstances justify it. You should not disarm the authority of the police by a decision
to the contrary. If upon confirming this principle you find that the circumstances in the
present case were not such as to render legal a measure as general as the one taken, it is
unimportant from the doctrinal point of view.•.•"
91 In this respect the decision vindicates Hauriou, who defends the doctrine of
voie de f ait as necessary to confining administrative activity within its constitutional
domain. HAuRrou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 12th ed., 26 (1933).
92 See Professor Waline's note in D. 1935.3.25.
93 "To ,seize the newspaper in all places where held for sale in Paris and suburbs."
9 -1 To seize certain property regardless of the immediate concern of maintaining
public order.
9 ~ D. 1935-3-25; 53 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 296 (1936).
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Professor W aline placed a somewhat di:fferent interpretation. 96 A
trespass could indeed result from the sole fact that the seizure, "ordered in such a general manner," was not necessary for the maintenance
of order and security. In other words, the direct sanction, i.e., the seizure
resorted to under the circumstances, was not justified in the sense of
the limitations established in the Saint-Just case. 07 Consequently, the
decision of the court must be taken to hold 98 ( r) that under the circumstances, though not per se, the act of the prefect was illegal; (2)
that the act tended to violate a civil liberty; and (3) that the resulting
invasion of the freedom of the press in the form of the seizure of a
newspaper was so severe that it constituted a trespass.
It is this third element, first emphasized by Waline, that must
receive further attention. There is nothing either in the underlying
conclusions or in the tenor of the decision which immediately suggests
this last qualification. The only outstanding fact, on the surface, is
that in the Action franfaise case an encroachment upon the freedom
of the press was treated as a trespass for the first time. But the encroachment had to be of a particular quality before a trespass could be
found; and if the earlier cases are viewed in the light of this limitation, it is now possible to discern a trend to apply the trespass doctrine
only where the imputed violation has been particularly severe. 99 So,
where property rights are concerned, a dispossession 100 seems to be
requisite, and this rather as to real property than merely as to personalty.101 With dispossession as the standard to be applied in case of
96

See note in D. 1935.3.25.
1904.3.17.
Cf. Waline's note, D. 1935,3,25.
99
Waline, D. 1935°.3.25, thinks that the presence of a trespass may equally depend
upon the seriousness of the formal illegality of the act instead of that of its consequences,
citing for a drastic illustration, Lacombe v. Perrier, D. 1876.3..,51. In that case the
Tribunal des Conflits found a trespass because the mayor had violated a criminal statute
by causing graves and corpses to be disturbed in locating the foundations for a church
building.
10°Cf. the introductory notes preceding the report of the decision of the Tribunal
des Conflits in Montlaur v. Balmigere, Mayor of Tournissan, Recueil, 1904.888 at
889: "So long as the administration stays on its own ground, does not invade private
property, but reaches it from without only and does not put its hand upon it, the
impairment of the owner's enjoyment, no matter how severe, is not for the judicial
cognizance; on the other hand, the judicial courts have exclusive jurisdiction if there
is a trespass, i.e., if there is on the part of the state [per.ronne publique] an encroachment, taking, seizure, or usurpation in respect to private real property whose protection
is specially entrusted to those authorities."
101 See the cases discussed above, page 2155 ff. Note in particular Monpillie v.
Gruet, D. 1921.1.41 (emphasized in Waline's note, D. 1935.3.25), where even the
Cour de Cassation denied the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in a case involving the
97
98
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violations of property rights, what sort of invasions of civil liberties
will correspond in point of severity? Very probably 102 unlawful detention in the matter of personal liberty,103 illegal deprivation of the use
of property devoted to a cult resulting in the violation of religious
freedom 104 and, in the case of the freedom of the press, the illegal
seizure of a newspaper.105
•
While the foregoing analysis reveals a trend which permits a more
accurate definition of administrative trespass, there is yet another
deduction to be made from the decision in the Action franfaise case
which is of importance. Apparently the decision must be understood
to confirm that a trespass does not necessarily imply a malfeasance,
i.e., a quasi-delict. In other words, it need not invariably coincide with
a faute personnelle.10° Consequently, there may be a bona fide trespass
removal from stores of non-inspected meat over the objection of the owners. There was
procedural irregularity which in this country would have provoked at least an allegation
of want of due process. However, the act was held to be administrative, very probably
on the ground that th~ disregard for procedure was comparatively slight. But again,
it may be, as Waline seems to suggest, that the holding was influenced by the fact that
ouly personal property was involved. Evidently the case of Bailly v. Carques, D.
1918.3.1 at 4, concerning a procedurally irregular military requisition of cattle and
grain, is susceptible of analogous interpretation, and both cases can on the same ground
be contrasted with the contrary holding in the Union Villeneuvoise case, D. H. 1931.135, where the Tribunal des Conflits was concerned with the occupation of an entire
factory by the military. Cf. also City of Mende v. Roussel, D. 1910.1.266, where the
Cour de Cassation found in favor of the jurisdiction of the civil court because of a
trespass resulting from the destruction of a private water conduit; and De Gaste v.
Hospices, D. 1895.3.45, where, on the contrary, the Tribunal des Conflits declared the
administrative courts competent in a somewhat similar situation. There was neither a
dispossession nor a trespass upon plaintiff's property; furthermore, no property right in
the bed of the water course but only a right to the water being at stake, compensation
for any permanent damage sustained had to be sought in the Conseil de Prefecture
because it resulted from the construction of a public works. Law of 28 Pluviose, year
VIII (1800), art. 4.
However, it should be observed that Waline himself seems to take a different
view in his DRoIT ADMINISTRATIF (1936). There he says (p. 56): "The jurisdiction.
belongs to the civil courts in all cases of trespass, even though there is no dispossession."
It would follow that in the foregoing cases where there was no dispossession, the jurisdiction of the administrative courts must be attributed to the absence of a sufficient
degree of illegality. Cf. Matter of Fremy, Recueil, 1933.1159 (Conseil d'Etat), upholding a Conseil de Prefecture which had declined to take jurisdiction in a matter of
"taking irregularly possession of private property" in connection with the construction
of an electric power line.
102 Waiine's note in D. 1935.3.25.
103 Cf. Labadie v. Gaillardon, D. 1876.1.289.
104 Cf. Cure de Realrµont v. Maire de Realmont, S. 1935.3.97.
105 Action fran~aise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, D. 1935.3.25.
106 JEZE, LES PRINCIPE$ GENERAUX DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 79, note 2 (1925),
takes the view that trespass and the quasi-delictual quality of the act are inseparable.
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with no personal liability on the part of the administrative agent. If,
therefore, voie de fait is primarily a notion objective while faute personnelle is a notion subjective, the coincidence of both elements in some
cases is nevertheless possible.101 But it is especially the "impersonal"
element of the concept that must be borne in mind when appraising
its value and its function. In the light of the foregoing analysis, the
concept of administrative trespass appears by no means simple, but
rather multi-facetted. Granting illegality, the violation of one or the
other of certain rights does not seem to be sufficient of itself to consummate the trespass; the injury inflicted must show a certain intensity
to which the courts will look. As for the degree of illegality which is
deemed destructive of the administrative qualities of the act, the problem is even more intricate. It may be well enough to hold the act to
be non-administrative in a case where the culpable authority clearly
stepped over the borders of the domain belonging constitutionally to
the administrative department of government. But where there is
merely procedural irregularity the administrative agency obviously
has remained within those borders, and, in fact, has acted under express
statutory authority, though it has failed to exercise its powers according to specified methods. 108 And again, there may be trespass although
there i~ not only color of authority but a legitimate administrative
objective and good faith in the attempted realization. In such cases,
can it be justly said that the act is not administrative? Does not the
phrase "a trespass can never be an administrative act," once again
employed by the commissioner in the Action franfaise case, appear to be
no more than a formula? 109 Is not the real function of the trespass
doctrine concealed in this very formula, that is, to serve as a device
for avoiding the unwieldiness of the principle of the separation of
the administrative and judicial authorities? No sweeping modification
of that doctrine is wanted, but a means of giving greater play to individual exigenci~s without sacrifice of the principle. In certain cases of
invasions of personal liberties and property rights, particularly in the
form of direct administrative sanctions, it may be eminently a question
of policy where jurisdiction is to fall. The administration is undoubtSee also 3 DuGUIT, DRoIT coNSTITUTIONNEL 715 (1923); cf. APPLETON, CoNTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 2:;3 (1927). But see HAUll.Iou, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 10th
ed., 36 (note 3 beginning p. 35) (1921), who recognizes that "in the case of trespass
there is frequently malfeasance on the part of the functionary," engaging his personal
liability.
107
Waline's note, D. 1935.3.25 at 27.
108
Ibid. at 27, col. 2.
100
Ibid. at 3 1, col. I.
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edly interested in protecting its own actions, as well as its functionaries,
from any other than its own censure. It will not readily admit that it
has stepped beyond its lawful domain, for that might tend to impair
its authority and arouse popular antagonism. But also, politically it
may be to its advantage to respect, as far as possible, the traditional
protectorate of the ordinary courts over "life, liberty and property."
Furthermore, there will be cases where its prestige will be best served
if only its subordinate agent, and not the administration, is identified
with a given act. Where redress of an alleged trespass is sought in the
ordinary courts, the administration may signify its insistence upon the
administrative character of the act by claiming jurisdiction and by
defending its position before the Tribunal des Confl.its. Or, it may
tacitly concede the error of its agent. Similarly, where relief is applied
for in the administration's own courts, these courts may retain jurisdiction or they may denounce the act of the agent and refer it to the
judicial authorities.
The manifold implications surrounding the trespass doctrine indicate that out of a seemingly simple rule of jurisdiction it has grown into
a complex device, a device permitting sporadic modifications of the
principle of the separation of authorities and implementing the reconciliation of that principle with the "unwritten" rule of the guardianship of the ordinary courts over the rights and liberties of the people
in specific situations.
It has been pointed out that the separation of powers in France
was originally intended to bring about a stricter independence of the
administrative department of government from judicial control or
interference.110 Viewed from this angle, the concept of administrative
trespass might indeed be taken to have at first envisaged only those
acts of administrative functionaries which constituted pure usurpations;
that is, acts which were conspicuously "non-administrative." The jurisdiction of the ordinary courts would then appear to be nothing more
than a necessary consequence, and the doctrine as nothing more than
a form of stating that consequence. However such an interpretation
could not possibly be reconciled with other contemporary rules,111 and
Supra, note 6.
Prior to the law of September 19, 1870, 70 DuvERGIER, COLLECTION DES
Lois 335 (1870), administrative officials could be prosecuted in the ordinary courts on
account of delictual acts, committed in the exercise of official functions, only with the
consent of the administration. 1 LAFERRIERE, JuRIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE, 2d ed.,
637 ff. (1896).
.
110
111
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furthermore it is not at all tenable if examined in connection with the
more recent judicial applications.
The substance of this phase of French public law has thus an uncommonly familiar tone. Perhaps the droit administratif is too often
thought of solely in terms of administrative independence from judicial
scrutiny. True, the separation of powers in France has been made
to preclude the judicial authorities from interfering with administrative
action, and special administrative courts have sprung into existence to
afford review of all administrative action. But notwithstanding the
basic principle and the resulting combination of the administrative
and judicial processes within the administrative organism, unconstitutional and illegal encroachments upon civil liberties and property
rights will not escape inquiry in the judicial tribunals at the instance
of any injured party. In other words, "judicial review" as understood
in this country, that is, as a guarantee of the supremacy of the law
and of due process of law, is by no means foreign to the French conception of justice.

